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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah
Code Annotated and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Inasmuch as this is an appeal from a Summary Judgment, a
correctness standard applies, without according deference to
the trial court's decision.

State vs. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah

1994) ; Mountain States Tel. & Tel, vs. Garfield County, 811
P.2d 184 (Utah 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. vs. Dixie
Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).

All facts are

to be viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party.
The View Condominium Owners Association vs. MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT
App. 104, 514, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
applies to all issues.

The correctness standard

All issues are preserved by reason of

lower court Memorandum Decision and Order dated April 21, 2004
(R. 990-1008, Addendum No. 1 ) . Issues to be decided on appeal
are:
A.

Whether Salt Lake County's slope ordinance which

prohibits construction of structures on slopes which exceed a
30% grade constitutes an unconstitutional taking when applied
to a building lot in a platted pre-existing residential
subdivision; and if so, is plaintiff's case ripe for the
entitlement of just compensation.
i

B.

Whether appellant is entitled to rescind his purchase

contract on the grounds of mutual mistake.
C.

Whether appellant is entitled to rescind his purchase

contract on the grounds of breach of covenant under a warranty
deed, and particularly the covenant against enctimbrances.
D.

Whether Utah recognizes an implied warranty of

fitness for purpose, and if so, whether there that been a
breach of said implied covenant.
APPLICABLE COSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

Constitutions:
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States
"nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation".
Article I, Section 22, Utah Constitution
"private property shall not be taken or damaged
for a public use without just compensation".

B.

Statutes:
§17-27-810
"If the legislative body is satisfied that
neither the public nor any person will be materially
injured by the proposed vacation, alteration, or
amendment, and that there is good cause for the
vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the
plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot".

C.

Ordinances:
Salt Lake County Takings Relief Ordinance
Attached hereto at Addendum No. 2.
o

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Jason Arnell purchased a residential building
lot in a platted subdivision from defendant Truman G. Madsen
and paid cash in the amount of $95,000.

At the time of the

sale neither the buyer nor the seller were aware of a County
slope ordinance which prohibited building on any lot with a 30%
or greater slope.

This lot exceeded the slope limitation,

although many other homes existed in the subdivision along the
very same slope.

Salt Lake County has denied appellant the

right to build on the lot, thereby making it valueless for any
viable economic purpose.

Appellant claims that the actions of

Salt Lake County constitute an unconstitutional taking under
which it is obligated to pay appellant just compensation.
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to rescind the
purchase contract under theories of mutual mistake, breach of
covenant under a warranty deed, or breach of an implied
covenant of fitness for purpose.
filed motions for summary judgment
judgment was denied.

All parties to this action
Arnell's motion for summary

Salt Lake County and Madsen's motions for

summary judgment were granted.

This appeal followed.

Q

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment was submitted to
the trial court on the following undisputed facts.
1.-

On or about May 4, 1999, plaintiff Jason Arnell

purchased a subdivision lot near Brighton, Utah from defendant
Truman Madsen for the sum of $95,000.

(Admitted in pleadings;

R. 1, 11, 68, 81, 89). The description of the lot is as
follows:
Lot 13, Forest Glen, plat "B" according to the official
plat thereof recorded in the office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder.
2.

Arnell purchased the subdivision lot for the purpose

of constructing a canyon residence.
3.

The property was conveyed from Madsen to Arnell by

Warranty Deed.
4.

(R. 135).

(R. 253, 257) .

The subject lot is part of a platted subdivision

which was approved by Salt Lake County in 1970 after the
subdivision developers met all of the County's subdivision
requirements.
5.

(R. 135).

After the approval of the subdivision, Salt Lake

County, in August, 1997, enacted an ordinance which prohibits
the building of structures on canyon lots having a slope of
thirty percent (30%) or more.
the subject lot exceeds 30%.

(R. 212).

It is admitted that

6.

Although the lot has a steep slope, there is nothing

about the lot or its location that would make it unsafe or
unfeasible to build upon.

See unchallenged pre-filed testimony

of plaintiffs, architect, and engineers (R. 187-193, 201-207)
together with County response concurring with such opinions (R.
194) .
7.

At the time of the purchase of the lot other homes

existed along the same slope on other lots in the subdivision.
(R. 135).
8.

At the time of the purchase of the subdivision lot,

neither Arnell nor Madsen had knowledge of the slope ordinance.
(R. 135, 255).
9.

After learning of the slope ordinance, Arnell made

application to the Salt Lake Board of Adjustment for a
variance.

After a hearing, the variance was denied on February

16, 2000.

(Alleged at R. 119 and admitted at R. 264, 324).

10.

Salt Lake County has a Takings Relief Ordinance (the

Ordinance) which sets out a procedure for obtaining relief
where an unconstitutional taking of property is claimed.
Plaintiff filed a Petition with Salt Lake County seeking relief
under the Ordinance.

(Salt Lake County Takings Relief

Ordinance, R. 141, attached hereto as Addendum 2; Takings
Relief Petition at R. 163).

11.

Under the Ordinance, the first step requires a

preliminary determination that a takings had occurred.

Salt

Lake County made a "Preliminary Determination of Taking" on
March 28, 2000.

(Letter from Salt Lake County of April 6,

2000; R. 185). A Hearings Officer was then appointed to
conduct the hearing and make recommendations to the County
Commission.

Robert A. Thorup of the law firm of Ray, Quinney &

Nebeker was appointed as the Hearings Officer.

(Letters from

Salt Lake County of April 5, 2000 and April 6, 2000; (R. 182,
185) .
12.
hearings.

Mr. Thorup thereafter moved forward and conducted two
In doing so, the Hearings Officer requested that the

sworn testimony of all witnesses be submitted ahead of time in
writing, and that the witness then be available for crossexamination at the hearing.
duly submitted by petitioner.
unsworn proffer.
facts in dispute.

Such written sworn testimony was
Salt Lake County submitted an

For the most part there were no significant
(Petitioner's pre-filed evidence in support

of Takings Relief Ordinance R. 187-193; letter response from
Salt Lake County dated July 25, 2000 R, 194-196; petitioner's
rebuttal to pre-filed evidence; R. 201-207).
13.

Prior to the hearing Mr. Thorup advised the parties

that he intended to make findings on seven factual matters as
listed in §19.93.040 of the Ordinance, and that his conclusions

would be based upon these findings.

The seven factual

determinations were to be:
(1)

Whether petitioner had complied with the

recjuirements for providing information to be submitted
under the Ordinance.
(2)

Whether petitioner had a protectable interest in

the property.
(3)

The market value of the property considering the

existing zoning regulation.
(4)

The market value of the property under the

proposed use.
(5)

Whether there are other economically viable uses

that may be made of the property.
(6)

The market value that may exist if there is an

opportunity for cluster development.

(This category is

not applicable to the subject case).
(7)
feasible.

Whether construction on the property is
Prior to the hearing, Salt Lake County

stipulated that the petitioner had met items 1 and 2 and
that 6 was not applicable.

(Alleged at R. 120, and

admitted at R. 264, R. 415 and Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure).
14.

After taking the matter under advisement, Mr.

Thorup rendered his decision on September 11, 2000.
7

Findings on all seven of the categories were made in favor
of petitioner.
(1)

He found:

That petitioner had complied with all

requirements for submitting information.

(Finding 14; R.

213);
(2)

That petitioner was owner of the property and

had a protectable interest.
(3)

(Finding 15; R. 2 1 3 ) ;

That the market value of the property if the

existing slope ordinance is applied is substantially zero.
(Finding 16; R. 213)
(4)

That the market value based upon the proposed

use without regard to the zoning ordinance is $95,000.
(Finding 17; R. 213)
(5)
property.
(6)

That there are no other viable uses for the
(Finding 18; R. 2 1 3 ) .
That from an architectural, engineering and

soils standpoint, the construction of a residence on the
subject property is feasible.

(Finding 20; R. 213)

Notwithstanding the sweeping factual findings in favor of
petitioner, Mr. Thorup found that petitioner Jason Arnell had
no standing to bring the action because he acquired the
property after the passage of the zoning ordinance.

Because of

his perception of a lack of standing, he recommended to the
County Commission that the Petition for Relief be denied,

p

(See

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Decision
is attached hereto as Addendum 3 ) .
15.

After the rendition of Mr. Thorup's decision,

petitioner submitted a request for rehearing and
redetermination.

The Request was based primarily upon the fact

that petitioner had never been asked, nor had he ever been
given the opportunity to address the standings issue.

The

request was in the form of a five-page letter which thoroughly
briefed all of the arguments and authorities on the standings
issue.

(See letter of October 4, 2000, from David E. West

requesting rehearing and reconsideration, R. 216).
16.

After receiving counsel's request for a rehearing,

Mr. Thorup wrote to Salt Lake County suggesting a date for the
rehearing.

(See letter of October 6, 2000, from Robert Thorup

to Salt Lake County; R. 221). He received a response from the
District Attorney's office advising that until the County
Commission meets on this matter that the County not be required
to respond to any petition for reconsideration.

(Letter of

October 12, 2000, from Deputy District Attorney Kent Lewis to
A. R. Thorup; R. 222). Mr. Thorup therefore did not proceed to
hear or rule upon petitioner's request for reconsideration.
17.

On July 5, 2001, as a courtesy, Mr. Thorup wrote a

letter to both counsel calling their attention to a United
States Supreme Court case, Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, decided
Q

June 28, 2001.

That case specifically holds that an assignee

or a grantee of property has standing under the United States
Constitution to bring a condemnation action for inverse
condemnation.

That case, with respect to the standings issue,

would be controlling here.

(See Robert Thorup's letter of July

5, 2001, together with copy of complete Decision in Palazzolo
case; R. 223-234).
18.

Counsel for petitioner replied to Mr. Thorup's letter

by calling his attention to the fact that the request for
rehearing and reconsideration had not as yet been ruled upon;
reviewing the arguments as previously made; and in light of the
Palazzolo decision, requesting Mr. Thorup to amend his
recommendation to the Salt Lake County Commission.

(See David

E. West letter of July 10, 2001 to Robert Thorup; R. 235) .
19.

Robert Thorup responded to counsel's July 10, letter

in the following manner:

He sent a one page letter to counsel

advising that he could not conduct post-decision proceedings
because he had not been authorized to do so by the County.
(Thorup letter of July 12, 2001; R. 238).

He also wrote a

scathing letter to Salt Lake County criticizing the way in
which the matter had been handled; expressing his personal
offense for having been mislead by the County and having
suffered an impairment to his reputation for not being
permitted to act independently; and advised the County that the

Palazzolo case overruled his previous recommendation decision.
He further pointed out that as it now stood his "recommended
decision found that a taking had occurred without just
compensation".

(Letter of Robert Thorup to Salt Lake County of

July 18, 2001; R. 239; attached hereto as Addendum 4 ) .
20.

Following all of the above, the matter was ultimately

presented to the Salt Lake County Council.

The Council heard

oral arguments and elected to totally ignore the recommendation
and findings made by its Hearings Officer.

Although the

Council heard no evidence, it directed the County Attorney to
prepare entirely new findings of fact and conclusions of law.
These findings and conclusions addressed a multitude of issues
outside the scope of plaintiff's Petition of Relief and upon
which no evidence was ever presented.

The decision denied

Arnell's Petition for a building permit or for compensation.
(Alleged at R. 124, and admitted at R. 264, R. 415, and Rule
7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P.; copy of complete Decision is attached
hereto as Addendum 5 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issues Against Salt Lake County
1.

The United States and Utah Constitutions prohibit the

taking of private property without the payment of just
compensation.
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2.

Where a statute or ordinance denies all economically

beneficial or productive use or land, compensation is required
under the takings clause.
3.

The Salt Lake County slope ordinance deprives

appellant of all economically viable use of his subdivision
building lot,
4.

Salt Lake County has made it clear that it will not

permit development of the subject lot, and the case is
therefore ripe for the granting of relief.
Issues Against Defendant Madsen
1.

At the time of the lot purchase agreement between

Arnell and Madsen, there was a material assumption that the lot
was buildable.
2.

Neither party was aware of the Salt Lake County slope

ordinance.
3.

The existence of the slope ordinance which makes the

lot valueless and unbuildable was a material mistake of fact
enabling the buyer to rescind the purchase contract.
4.

A second and separate ground for allowing recession

is based upon breach of covenant under a warranty deed.
property was conveyed to appellant by warranty deed.

The

The

existence of the slope restriction constitutes a breach of the
covenant against encumbrances.

1 O

5.

As a third and separate ground appellant should be

entitled to rescind the purchase contract based upon the breach
of an implied covenant of fitness for purpose.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
A.

The Taking.

Amendment V of the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
prohibit the taking of property without just compensation.

A

taking can be in the form of a physical taking or a regulatory
taking.

A regulatory taking may exist where state or local

laws impose unreasonable restrictions upon the use of property.
A regulation which falls short of eliminating all economic
benefit may constitute a taking depending upon the extent of
interference, the type of regulation, and the extent to which
reasonable investment backed expectations have been destroyed.
Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112
S.Ct. 2886 (1992).

But these factors need not be addressed

here because it is clear that one definite rule has emerged:
Where a land use restriction deprives or renders a property
valueless for any economically viable use, there is an
unconstitutional taking.

Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.

606, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (2001); Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal

Council, supra; Agins vs. City of Tiberon, 447 U.S. 225, 100
S.Ct. 2138 (1980); Smith Investment Company vs. Sandy City, 985
P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1998).

See also dissenting opinion of

Judge Orme in B.A.M. Development vs. Salt Lake City, 2004 UT
App. 34, 493 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 138 wherein the subject of
regulatory takings is discussed in detail.
In the instant case, the slope regulation of Salt Lake
County clearly amounts to a confiscation or deprivation of the
property.

This is a residential subdivision lot having no

other viable purpose than a site for a residence.

The County

regulation and the actions taken by the County have reduced its
$95,000 value to zero.
construction.

The lot is otherwise feasible for

The County itself made a preliminary

determination that a taking had occurred.

The matter was

referred to an independent Hearings Officer who conducted
hearings, took evidence, and made detailed findings concluding
that a takings had occurred.

Yet in spite of this, the County

Council, in not wanting to set a precedent that might apply to
others in Arnell's position, ignored its own Hearings Officer,
and, without holding further hearings or taking evidence, made
its own findings.

In doing so, the County completely ignored

the seven categories which under its own taking ordinance
determined whether a taking has occurred; extolled the virtues
and purposes of the slope ordinance; made non-evidentiary

assumptions relating to water availability; and made arguments
and assumptions relating to non-existent construction problems
which challenge the uncontroverted engineering testimony,
including the testimony given by its own County geologist.

The

Salt Lake County slope ordinance may well be a desirable
regulation, but, it cannot usurp the requirement to pay just
compensation as guaranteed in the Utah and United Stated
Constitutions.
B.

Ripeness.

As a result the Palazzolo decision, Salt

Lake County no longer challenges plaintiff s standing in which
to bring this action.

It no longer makes any challenges to the

timeliness of plaintiffs claim (a defense raised in the trial
court) , nor does it seriously dispute any of the legal
principles set forth in subsection A above.

What it now

argues, and what it successfully persuaded the trial court to
do, is that(relief be denied on the basis of ripeness A

In

other words, it argues that Salt Lake County has never really
and truly denied plaintiff the right to construct a building on
the lot.

This argument is unconvincing in light of the long

history as to what has transpired, and the plain language of
the County decision.

Nor is it constitutionally supportable.

When plaintiff first made application to the Board of
Adjustment he sought only a variance from the slope ordinance.
No other relief was even claimed.
15

Plaintiff has never asked to

be relieved of any building codes or safety regulations which
may be in place, including any engineering requirements for
safe construction or other building restrictions.

The meeting

Agenda shows only that Arnell was seeking a variance from the
slope ordinance.

The issue before the Board of Adjustment was

the slope ordinance, and the slope ordinance alone.
The County argues that had the plaintiff come to the Board
of Adjustment with specific building and site plans, that the
result might have been different.

They now argue that the

County has never said that a variance would necessarily be
denied if such detailed information had been furnished.

They

would suggest that the owner should incur as much as $10,000 in
architectural and engineering fees before appearing before the
Board to request a variance from the slope ordinance.1

But why

should any reasonable person ever be required to incur
thousands of dollars in expenses before he knows whether he can
build anything at all.

This would be like committing to a

1

One of the dissenting members of the Board of Adjustment,
Kevin Oakes, raised this very issue. His transcript states:
It is unfair to ask someone to spend in excess of $10,000 on
reports until we can grant a variance saying that yes, he can
possibly build on that lot with the stipulation that he meet
the ordinance and any safety conditions that we would impose
upon him . . . I do have some real concerns about the safety
issues and it will cost the applicant in excess of $10,000 to
prove or disprove the fact that it is safe or unsafe to build
on that lot. It bothers me that we would take away is right to
build".

16

construction contract, or to the purchasing of custom
furnishings, before one knows whether a building will be
permitted.
The County argues that it wants to control what is built
and is unwilling to give variances that run with the land.

But

the whole point is that plaintiff is entitled to a variance
that runs with the land, subject of course, to all other
legitimate building restrictions.
The same is true with respect to Arnell's Petition for
Relief under the County's taking ordinance.

Plaintiff's

detailed Takings Relief Petition addressed only the slope
ordinance.

The hearings and the evidence presented likewise^

addressed only the slope ordinance.

The findings of the

hearings officer focused only on the slope^rdinance.

And

although the County Council, in its conclusions, made
references to water requirements and other requirements outside
the scope of any evidence that was presented, the ultimate
denial was based upon the slope ordinance.

The conclusions

list a whole host of possible problems that conceivably are
associated with slopes, and stress that the County does not
want to set any precedents that would allow construction on
sloped lots.

It makes a point to recite that the slope

requirement has been in force by the County for twenty-five
(25) years, clearly implying that the County is not about to
17

depart from its policy now.

It is very clear from the opinion

that the denial is based upon the slope ordinance generally and
not upon the failure of the applicant to supply some detailed
engineering detail.

The whole tenor of the opinion makes it

crystal clear that the providing of more detailed plans to the
County would have made no difference whatsoever.
What the County now seems to be saying is that it hasn't
ever unconditionally stopped Arnell from building, and now,
after four (4) years of litigation, tells him that he is
certainly free to start over.

They would even add that maybe

if Arnell spends enough money for detailed architectural and
engineering fees, we might reconsider.

This carrot is, of

course, totally illusory in light of the County's formal
decision.

And, under the law, Arnell is only reguired_jfco^

exhaust his administrative remedies once - not repeatedly.
The argument raised by Salt Lake County that the door is
still open for further consideration is the same argument made
and rejected in the case of Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, supra.
In Palazzolo a property owner was precluded from developing
wetlands.

There it was argued successfully to the trial court

that the matter was not ripe for decision because even though
Rhode Island had denied petitioner the right to fill wetlands,
there was still doubt as to the extent of development that
would be permitted.

Thus, the reasoning went that although

petitioner's grandiose development proposal was denied, there
was still the possibility that lesser uses might be permitted,
and that the court could not know for sure the extent of the
development that would be permitted.

This argument was flatly

rejected by the United States Supreme Court.

The Court

acknowledged that a landowner may not establish a taking before
a land use authority has had an opportunity to determine the
extent of the permitted usage, but government officials may not
burden property by the imposition of repetitive or unfair
procedures in order to avoid a final decision.

In Palazzolo

the Council would have been permitted to allow exceptions where
"a compelling public purpose" is served, but the Council's
decision found that the petitioner did not satisfy the
"compelling public purpose" standard.

This removed any further

discretion as the parties were all in agreement that the
ordinance forbids the fill of wetlands for any purpose and with
no fill there could be no structures (just at the Salt Lake
County ordinance forbids the construction on slopes that exceed
thirty percent).

The ultimate holding was that when a State

agency charged with the enforcement of land use regulations,
entertains an application from an owner, and the denial of the
application makes clear the extent of the development
permitted, federal ripeness rules do not require the submission
of further applications.
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In the instant case the County has acted.

The action

includes findings that the granting of any exception or
variance would defeat the purpose of the Wasatch Canyons Master
Plan (Conclusion Number 8 of Salt Lake County's Decision);
would open the door to having to provide similar relief to lot
owners similarly situated (Conclusion Number 8 ) ; that strict
enforcement is a proper exercise of the police power to
increase overall safety and value to other property (Conclusion
Number 6 ) ; that construction on slopes per se presents a host
of other problems enumerated in Conclusion Number 5; that
Arnell's lot may not be able to comply with the requirements of
other agencies (Conclusions Number 3 and 4 ) ; and concludes that
steep lots are nearly impossible to service, protect or develop
in an environmentally sensitive manner (Conclusion Number 2 ) .
One cannot read these findings and glean any ray of hope that
the County would waive the slope requirement under any
circumstances.

The findings are totally incompatible with any

reasonable expectation that Salt Lake County will allow
construction if more detailed construction plans are submitted.
C.

Penn Central Transportation vs. New York City.

Although the trial court acknowledged that Palazzolo was the
controlling authority, it moved to the earlier case of Penn
Central Transportation vs. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98
S.Ct. 2646 (1978) which it heavily relied upon in denying
on

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Yet, Penn Central

isn't remotely similar to Palazzolo, nor to the instant case.
In Penn Central the plaintiff s use of a terminal building was
designated as a historical landmark, thereby restricting the
destruction or the alteration of the building.

The U.S.

Supreme Court found that the landmark designation was not a
"taking" within the meaning of the 5th Amendment.

The holding

was largely based upon the fact that the landmark law did not
interfere with the terminal's present use; that Penn Central
was realizing a "reasonable return" on its investment; that the
law did not impose any drastic limitations upon the ability of
the owner to use the property; and that the preservation of
historical buildings was a desirable thing to be encouraged.
The fact that these may have brought about some diminution of
value, as is the case with ordinary zoning laws, does not of
itself constitute a taking.

Penn Central does not involve a

situation, or even a claim, that the owner has been deprived of
all viable economic benefit of the property, and it does not
support the holding of the trial court.

The court simply does

not need to look behind the more recent case of Palazzolo vs.
Rhode Island, supra, which, as previously stated, stands for
the proposition that ripeness rules do not require repeated
applications once the decision of the regulatory authority
makes clear the extent of development that will be permitted.
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A very recent Utah case appears to be in harmony with the
federal ripeness cases.

The View Condominium Owners

Association vs. MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT App. 104, 235, 497 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3.

Here the town of Alta entered into an agreement

with PUD Developers which included the removal of an earlier
snow storage designation upon what had been designated as Lot
9.

Such action would have serious impact upon owners of

property in adjoining lots, as it would limit snow storage
space and may require that the town would have to enjoin or
limit occupancy of adjoining lots during snow periods.

The

owners claim for an unconstitutional taking was dismissed by
the trial court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the

trial court's decision, holding that there were sufficient
facts to establish that government action had substantially
lessened the value of the property and interfered with the
owner's right to the use and enjoyment thereof.

Although the

issue of ripeness was not specifically addressed, the facts of
the case clearly established that no physical taking, or the
extent thereof, had actually yet occurred.
D.

Other Flaws in the Decision of the Trial Court.

In

addition to the inappropriate reliance upon Penn Central, there
are other major flaws in the decision of the trial court.
of these flaws are as follows:

Some

1.

At page 15 of the decision, Judge Medley makes

reference to the fact that relief may have been denied by
the County because it was not clear whether plaintiff
could connect to a public sewer or otherwise comply with
adequate sewer access.

This was never an issue before the

Board of Adjustment, nor was it an issue before the
Hearings Officer.

It is a conclusion that the County

made, without taking any evidence, after it directed the
County Attorney to disregard the findings of the Hearings
Officer and rewrite the findings.

It also was an issue

specifically addressed in Palazzolo.

In Palazzolo the

same argument was made that the petitioner may not have
been able to satisfy the requirements of other agencies,
specifically such as the allowance of individual sewage
disposal systems.

The U.S. Supreme Court found this

argument to be irrelevant and held firm to its holding
that repetitive applications are not required after the
regulatory agency makes it position clear.
2.

Judge Medley suggests at page 16 that there may

have been multiple reasons for the County's denial of
relief, among which was the plaintiff's failure to supply
the County with more detailed information.

Plaintiff has

always claimed that he supplied the County with
information requested, and the record does not reflect
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otherwise.

But whether he did or didn't becomes rather

irrelevant in light of the language of the County
decision.

The message from the County is not that it

would like to see more plan detail before granting
permission to build.

It is a clear message that we aren't

going to allow construction on non-conforming lots,
period.
3.

Even Judge Medley acknowledges at page 10 that,

"the language which the County chose provides at least
colloquial support for the contention that the decision
precludes any building on the lot, and hence, deprivation
of any economic value in the land".

He then quotes the

broad language of the decision and goes on to say that the
language was used after receiving plaintiff's data which
the Board of Adjustment had earlier found lacking.

He

then concludes that the absence of said reports (a fact
not in evidence) made it impossible for the County to act
knowingly on plaintiff's request to determine whether the
requirements for granting a variance had been met.
is no logic at all to this conclusion.

There

One cannot assume

that if the County had been satisfied with soil reports
and detailed construction plans, that the rest of its
decision would be ignored.
anything but vague.

The County decision is

The reasoning for the rejection
O/l

applies to all sloped lots, not just those whose owners
supply satisfactory soil reports.
4.

Throughout Judge Medley's decision he makes

reference to the fact that the regulation of homebuilding
on mountainous slopes is a proper exercise of the County's
police power, and to allow exception would defeat the
purpose of the master plan.
to deny relief.

But this is not justification

The mere fact that the County may be

acting within its police power does not excuse it from
paying just compensation when private property is
destroyed.

It cannot exercise powers that are forbidden

by the Constitution.

Coleman vs. Utah State Land Board,

795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
5.

At page 6, Judge Medley comments on the

undisputed fact that other non-conforming homes are
already in existence along the same slope, and argues that
this fact actually supports the County, reasoning that it
would be in the public interest for the County to mitigate
the damage that is already done.

Yet there is not a shred

of evidence anywhere for the trial court to conclude that
the existing homes are causing any damage.

And further,

such argument wouldn't excuse the County from its
constitutional obligation to pay just compensation anyway.

6.

At page 7 Judge Medley further comments that

after the variance was denied, and during the takings
relief process, there were delays in reaching a final
decision because the County was giving the plaintiff
additional time to bring in studies of the type the County
would like to see and so that County officials could
evaluate the data.

During this period, Judge Medley

concludes, that the parties were trying to negotiate a
resolution.

Judge Medley then speculates that no

resolution was reached and that the data supplied
apparently did not convince the County that the slope
ordinance effected the taking of plaintiff's property.
But there is no evidence to support this conclusion.
Whatever settlement discussions took place, if any, were
privileged.

And during this period the County had already

been advised by it's duly appointed Hearings Officer,
after two evidentiary hearings, that an unconstitutional
taking had already taken place.

When the County Council

elected to disregard the recommendation of the Hearings
Officer, and to rewrite his findings without taking new
evidence, or without taking part in the evidentiary
hearings, it could not pull new facts out of thin air.

It

elected to base its denial on broad principles that apply
to all sloped lots.

That being so, the County is in no

position to say to plaintiff that its decision wasn't
final.
E.

The actions of Salt Lake County in depriving

plaintiff of the use of his property have been illegal.

Since

the inception of this case plaintiff has argued to the County
that its actions in depriving him of the right to build is in
violation of §17-27-810 Utah Code Annotated.

That statute is

part of the title and chapter setting out procedures that must
be followed in order for the legislative body to vacate or
amend a platted subdivision, and provides as follows:
"If the legislative body is satisfied that neither
the public nor any person will be materially injured by
the proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that
there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or
amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate,
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any
street or lot".2
Obviously a finding of no material harm to Mr. Arnell
could not be made if the slope ordinance applies.
Strict requirements must be met for subdivision approval.
Once the subdivision is platted and approved for residential
construction, the lot owners are entitled to rely upon the
subdivision approval, and §17-27-810 established a form of

After the initiation of these proceedings §17-27-810 was
amended to eliminate the requirement of no material injury to
individual persons. Interestingly the amendment was an
innocuous part of an extremely lengthy amendment which amended
twenty-two sections of the Utah Code, and the title of the act
makes no mention of this specific change.
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preexisting rights that came into existence.

To later pass an

ordinance which prohibits the use of subdivision lots is
nothing more than an amendment of the subdivision, which
according to State law cannot be done without following the
strict procedures for subdivision amendment, including the
required finding that no person will be materially injured by
the amendment.

Salt Lake County cannot circumvent the

amendment process by a back door ordinance which ignores the
legislative requirements.
Salt Lake County should not be permitted to now benefit
from its illegal action by being relieved of its constitutional
obligation to pay just compensation.
POINT II
ARNELL WAS ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT
BASED UPON A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT
In addition to his claim against Salt Lake County, Arnell
sought alternative relief against the seller Madsen to rescind
the Purchase Contract based upon a mutual mistake of fact.

It

is undisputed in this case that Arnell was purchasing the lot
for the purpose of building a residence, and that neither party
was aware of the County slope ordinance or other restrictions.
These are very material assumptions that go to the very core of
the Purchase Contract.

It has been stated in Mooney vs. GR &

Associates, 749 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987) that:

"A party may rescind a contract, when at the time the
contract is made, the parties made a mutual mistake about
a material fact, the existence of which is a basic
assumption of the contract".
The above quote fits the instant case to a "t".
ordinance was in place when the contract was made.

The slope

And it just

can't be seriously disputed, either objectively or
subjectively, that a basic assumption of the Contract was that
a platted building lot in a residential subdivision was in fact
a lot upon which a structure could be built.

Otherwise there

would have been no purpose to the Contract.
The trial court in its decisionJaxushed off the mutual
mistake argument with a two sentence statement at page 17 to
the effect that there can be no mutual mistake of "an existing
fact" and that the County's refusal to grant a variance was a
future act, not an existing fact.
the facts here.

But this mischaracterizes

This just isn't a case like Kiahtypes vs.

Mills, 649 P.2d 9, (Utah 1992) relied upon by Madsen, where the
property was purchased with a specifically described mortgage
which the parties knew about and which the seller undertook the
obligation to get removed.

When he couldn't get the mortgage

removed he claimed a mutual mistake of fact in that the parties
thought that the mortgage could be removed.

The court in

Kiahtypes held that the principle of mutual mistake doesn't
cover future expectations.

But that situation is entirely

OQ

different.

This isn't a case where plaintiff purchased non-

conforming land hoping or expecting to get a variance in the
future.

When the sale was made, both parties understood that

the lot was buildable.

Nor is this a case where plaintiff

bought property which became the subject of a future zoning
ordinance or restriction. \The unknown slope limitation was in
place at the time of the sale and the parties didn't know about
it.

Nothing could be more existing.
The trial court further ignored^ArneJLl' s authorities which

strongly support his position.

Three easels closely in point

are as follows:
Rancourt vs. Verba, 678 A.2d, 8&6 (VT 1996) was a case
involving a building lot which the buyer purchased for the
purpose of building a lakeshore residence.
for the lot.

He paid $112,000

He later learned that he could not get a building

permit because of federal wetlands restrictions.

The buyer was

allowed to rescind the contract because of the mutual mistake
of both parties believing that it was a buildable lot.

It is

difficult to see how any case could be closer to the instant
case.

The only differences are that Arnell's was a canyon lot

rather than a waterfront lot; he paid $95,000 rather than
$112,000 for the lot; and the building restriction was a slope
violation rather than a wetlands violation.

In Lovier vs. Meteye, 260 So.2d, 377 ((LA 1972) a buyer was
permitted to rescind a sale where the sole W ^ o n for
purchasing the property was for the development of a commercial
enterprise, but where the property was zoned residential rather
than commercial, and where both the buyer and the seller
labored under a mistaken belief.

/<

\

Millman vs. Swan, 127 S.E. 166/(VA 1525) involved the
purchase of a lot which both parties believed to be outside the
town fire limits.

The distinction was important because if the

lot were to be within the limits, there were oppressive
building restrictions that would make construction much more
costly.

Thus, lots outside the limits were more valuable.

Both parties were of the mistaken belief that the lot was
outside the fire limits when in fact it was inside.

Because of

this mutual assumption, and because the cost of construction
would be much more than contemplated, the vendee was allowed to
rescind.
The decision of the trial court makes no reference to any
of the above authority.

Nor does it make any attempt to

distinguish or to otherwise cite any contrary authority.

The

concept of mutual mistake is simple and straightforward.

The

trial court simply erred in not applying it.

POINT III
ARNELL IS ALSO ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT
BASED UPON A BREACH OF COVENANT UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED
A second and separate ground to rescind the Purchase
Contract is a breach of covenant under seller's Warranty Deed.
The property was conveyed by Warranty Deed.

§57-1-12 Utah Code

Annotated provides that all warranty deeds contain certain
covenants, among which the grantor "guarantees the grantee
that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and the
grantor will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in
the grantee".

Thus, the question arises as to whether the

slope restriction in the instant case is an encumbrance.
Madsen took the position, and the trial court agreed, that
a building restriction, as a matter of law, is not an
"encumbrance" as that term is used in the warranty deed
statute.

There is some support for that position in the cases

of Flemitis vs. McArthur, 226 P.2d 124 (Utah 1951) and
Mortenson vs. Financial Growth, Inc., 456 P.2d 181 (Utah 1969),
although both cases are distinguishable and in conflict with
more recent Utah case law.
In Flemitis the language relied upon by Madsen is as
follows:
"Purchasers of land must take notice of public
restrictions restricting the use of the granted premises
and such restrictions constitute no breach of covenant or
warranty".

The above language, however, must be taken in the context of
the case where it was given.

Flemitis was not a zoning case.

Nor was it a building restriction or building use case.

It was

a case where a land patent had reserved certain water, mining
and easement rights.

A subsequent buyer in the chain of title

viewed these reservations as encumbrances and refused to pay to
seller the full amount of the purchase price.

In its decision

the court emphasized that the reservations recited in the
patent, which were based upon public statutes, were also on
record on the county recorder7s office.

So the holding was

based not only on the existence of the public statute but on
the additional fact that the document reserving the easements
was publicly recorded - a pretty important fact not existing in
the instant case.

Had the document not been recorded the

result may well have been different.
Mortensen vs. Financial Growth, supra, then comes along
later and recites the same language from Flemitis.

Mortensen

likewise was not a zoning case nor a case involving building
restrictions.

Mortensen involved the sale of a farm at a sales

price of $537,000.
$152,730.

The buyer didn't make the first payment of

The excuse was that the federal and state government

owned mineral rights on the property and it was argued that
since this was an encumbrance he was excused from making the
payment.

The court didn't buy this argument and allowed the

seller to terminate the contract for the failure of the buyer
to make payment.

In doing so, the court cited Flemitis to the

effect that under the circumstances of this case, the fair
assumption was that the reservation created by a public law was
not an encumbrance.

Then in tailoring this comment to the

facts of the case made references to multi-recitals in the
purchase contract all relating to such things as irrigated
land, dry farm land, range land, water rights and similar
matters, and pointing out that "there is no reference
whatsoever, and indeed no hint concerning mineral rights".

It

was just not a purpose for which the land was being purchased,
so the defaulting buyer was unable to carry the day with his
"encumbrance" argument.

The reservations in Mortensen and

Felmitis, having minimal impact on the property use, are quite
different from a restriction that renders the property useless.
The more recent cases define the term "encumbrance" in
much broader terms.

Most recently, the definition is given in

Holmes Development, LLC vs. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895,
where it is stated:
"This court has defined an encumbrance as "any
interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee
in the grantee, if such outstanding interest injuriously
affects the value of the property", Hancock vs. Planned
Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 183 (Utah 1990), or "constitutes
a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title
holder", Bergstrom vs. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah
1984).

See also Brewer vs. Peatmoss, 595 P.2d, 866 (Utah 1979);
Booth vs. Wyatt, 54 Utah 550, 183 Pac. 323 (1919).

Thus, if

the interest of Salt Lake County in prohibiting development
injuriously affects the value of the property, or constitutes a
burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee holder, it
comes within the above definition.

This definition has been

recited over and over again in the recent cases.

The

definition of the rule doesn't make any exception for zoning
ordinances.

And although plaintiff would acknowledge the

existence of authority to the effect that zoning
classifications per

se, and reasonable building restrictions

may not be actionable, one would be hard pressed to seriously
argue that a restriction such as the one here, which literally
makes the property useless for any viable purpose, is not an
encumbrance.

Even Madsen himself acknowledged that it was his

intention to warrant against any outstanding interest that
would injuriously affect the value of the property.

(R. 254).

The above being true, Arnell is entitled to rescind the
purchase contract based upon a breach of warranty and recover
his purchase price, plus interest.

See Bergstrom vs. Moore,

677 P.2d 1123, (Utah 1984) holding that where there is a breach
of the covenant against encumbrances under a warranty deed, the
rescission damages are the amounts paid for the property, less

any rental value (the subject lot being unbuildable has no
rental value).
POINT IV
ARNELL IS ENTITLED TO RESCIND THE PURCHASE CONTRACT BASED UPON
A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE
Under appellant's independent theories of mutual mistake
and breach of warranty deed, there is no reason to reach the
issue of implied warranty.

But if for some reason the court

determines that no mutual mistake exists, or that the building
restriction is not an encumbrance, there still is, or ought to
be, an implied covenant that the building lot is in fact a
building lot and can be used for the only purpose to which it
is suitable.

Such an implied covenant has historically been

recognized in sales of personal property.
§70A-2-315 Utah Code Annotated.

See codification at

Although the statute itself

does not apply to real estate, the reasoning and policies of
the Uniform Commercial Code have been carried over into real
estate transactions.

At 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales, §701 it is

stated as follows:
". . . courts may imply warranties of fitness in
connection with the sale and leasing of real estate,
viewing the Code's warranty provision as evidencing a
trend to warranties of fitness or as a statement of public
policy embodying the foremost legal thought in commercial
transactions. Thus, the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose has been extended to apply to the
purchase of a new condominium and to an air-conditioning
unit that is an integral part of the condominium".
(Citations omitted).

The Utah courts have established that there is no implied
warranty of habitability in real estate sales involving
structures.

American Towers Owners Association vs. CCI

Mechanical, Inc. 930 P.2d, 1182 (Utah 1996).

This is because

the buyer has an opportunity to thoroughly inspect the property
and satisfy himself as to the condition of the structure before
he purchases it.
building.

A buyer may not even want to inhabit the

However, American Towers acknowledges that in Utah

the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability applies to
leases.

This was established in Wade vs. Jobe, 818, P.2d 1006

(Utah 1991).

Our case, of course, does not involve a building

that is subject to inspection.

So if the opportunity for an

inspection element is removed from the equation we are much
closer to the lease than to a sales situation - in which event
an implied covenant of fitness for purpose ought to exist.
Nobody in this case challenges the proposition that both the
buyer and the seller understood that the purpose of the sale
was to enable the buyer to build a home.
There are other Utah cases that have dismissed implied
warranty claims in real estate situations where the sales
contract by its terms specifically excludes enumerated
warranties such as merchantability, fitness for a particular
purpose, and habitability.

Fennell vs. Green, 2003 UT App.
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291, 77 P.3d 339; Tibbitts vs. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425
P.2d 160 (1967).

Such reasoning would have to assume that in

the absence of such exclusionary language in the contract, that
implied covenants exist.

In the instant case there is no

contract between the parties which excludes any implied
warranties.

That being so, there is no reason why the concept

of fitness for purpose shouldn't apply.

The rationale

justifying this concept is no different in the sale of a
building lot than it would be in the sale of a motor-home, a
furnace, or a refrigerator.
CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
contained herein, appellant submits that the Summary Judgment
of the trial court be reversed; that appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment be granted; and the appellees' respective
Motions for Summary Judgment be denied.
DATED THIS

£&

day of July, 2004.

Q.0&L
D a v i d E. West
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JASON P. ARNELL

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

CASE NO. 020901035

:

SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT AND TRUMAN G. MADSEN :
Defendants.

:

Before the Court are the parties1

respective Motions for

Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7.
Having

considered

parties,

and

oral

the Motions, the Memoranda
argument

by

counsel, the

submitted by the
Court

enters

the

following decision:
BACKGROUND
In 1999 Plaintiff purchased a canyon lot near Brighton, Utah
from Defendant

Truman Madsen

building a cabin.
Forest

Glen

for $95,000, for the purpose of

The lot in question, platted as lot 13 of the

subdivision

which

is

within

what

is

called

the

"Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone" ("FCOZ"), contains an average
grade which exceeds 40%--and portions are at or above 50%. During
the planning stages of the project, Plaintiff was made aware that
construction upon properties within the FCOZ containing an average
grade in excess of 30% is restricted, and so sought a variance. At

ARNELL V. S. L. COUNTY
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
a

hearing

held

PAGE 2

February

16,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

2 0 00,

after_ expressing

concern

regarding the lack of specific data for plaintiff's proposed use^
the Board of Adjustment denied plaintiff's request, and informed
plaintiff of his right to seek his remedy from the County's takings
board.

On March 14, 2000, plaintiff timely filed an action in

this Court for review of the Board of Adjustment decision, but the
parties

later

stipulated

to

dismissal

of

the

action

without

prejudice, "subject to refiling."
Shortly after the Board of Adjustment decision, plaintiff
filed his takings petition with the County. On March 28, 2000, the
County preliminarily found that a takings may have occurred, and
appointed a hearing officer to conduct further proceedings and
issue a recommendation.
decision,

relying

upon

The hearing officer's September 11, 2000
the

recommended denial of the claim.

parties'

evidentiary

proffers,

While the decision was supported

by a finding that plaintiff possessed a compensable interest in the
property,

it held

that

plaintiff's

claim

warranted

dismissal

because he did not have standing to assert it, having purchased the
land after the passage of the FCOZ ordinance.
rehearing, but his

request

was

denied.

Plaintiff sought

The Board

of County

Commissioners took no immediate action upon the recommendation, at
least in part to provide plaintiff further opportunity to provide
them with site-specific data supporting his plan to build on the

ARNELL V. S. L. COUNTY
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
lot.

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

During the interim, on June 26, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court

decided Palazzolo v. State of Rhode Island 533 U.S. 606

(2001).

Upon learning of the decision, the hearing officer delivered to
counsel for the County and for plaintiff the Palazzolo decision as
a courtesy.

In his letter of July 18, 2001, the hearing officer

opined that "it is clear that

the Palazzolo case overrules my

recommended decision and will govern subsequent proceedings."
November

13,

2001,

the

County

Council

reviewed

On

plaintifffs

petition, considered the meaning and scope of Palazzolo, and on
January 8, 2002 filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
denying plaintiff's petition. This action followed.
ANALYSIS
APPEAL OF BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ACTION
Timeliness of Appeal
The

County

initially

contested

plaintiff's

challenge the Board of Adjustment decision.

right

to

now

It is undisputed that

the plaintiff's first action appealing the Board's decision was
filed within the 3 0-day appeal period.

The parties entered into a

Stipulation dismissing that action and reserved plaintiff's right
to re-file at a later date, which plaintiff did, just a week after
the stipulation was signed.
This Court's dismissal of the previous action was expressly
without

prejudice,

"subject

to

refiling

(sic)."

Honoring
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plaintiff's reservation of, and upholding the County's stipulation
to, plaintiff's right to re-file is consistent with Utah Code Ann.
§

78-12-40.

Based

thereon,

plaintiff's

appeal

is

timely.

Furthermore, defendant Salt Lake County withdrew its challenge to
the timeliness of_plaintif f's action with regard to the Board's
di

Five elements or requirements must be satisfied to qualify for
a variance

(see, Utah Code Ann., Section 17-27-707

elements include:fl(l)/(litefa/ enforcement of the zoning ordinance
would cause an unreasonable hardship for the applicant that is not
necessary to carry out th^generaj purpose of the zoning ordinance;
re are specia

cumstances attached to the property that

cio^jiot generally apply to properties in the same district; /(3)j
granting

the

variance

is

essential

to

the

enjoyment

of

a

substantial property right possessed by other property in the same
district; /j_4jL the variance will _not^ substa.ntially

affect

the

general planC^nd/will not h^jTrm^jraryj-o t-hp public interest: f(5)J
the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed/and)substantial
justice done,
First, A n this case, while it is conceivable that some plan
for

building

might

meet

the

"minimal

scarring"

purpose,

the

"prohibition of degradation" purpose, and the "aesthetic" purpose
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contained in the ordinance, the recommendation of_the staff was
tjjat the prohibition, even on lots already in existence at the time
of the adoption of the FCOZ ordinances, on construction on slopes
greater than 40%, was necessary^to carry out the general purposes
of the zoning ordinance.
enforcement

of

the

On the question of "whether the literal

zoning

ordinance

would

cause

unreasonable

hardship," it is clear hardship is located on or associated with
the property for which the variance is sought, but not that the
hardship comes from circumstances peculiar to this property.

The

record supports the cQjaclue-±-eB-~thaj^ slope is an issue for nearly
all of l^ig^JiQjLsL in the area.
economic

(the subject

The hardship was not self-imposed or

of the variance request was plaintiff's

ability to build, not how much more it would cost plaintiff to
build because of the ordinance) -J The record supports a conclusion
that

literal

enforcement
— — _

of

the

zoning

ordinance

under

the

^

circumstances presented to the Board would not create a hardship
that is unreasonable, given that plaintiff did not provide an}
specific evidence at the time of the hearing that the negative
/effects

the

ordinance

was

designed

to

ameliorate

would

be

sensitively addressed in plaintiff's development of the property.
>condy there are no special circumstances_attached to the
property that do not generally apply to properties in the same
district. The special circumstance, if any, is the slope, and this
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clearly relates to plaintiff's inability under the ordinance to
build upon the lot.
prohibits

development

However, it is not the slope itself that
of this lot, or any other

lot

in this

subdivision with comparable slopes, but rather the existence of the
slope ordinance--and as previously addressed, enforcement of the
restriction under

the circumstances

before

the Board was not

unrea^S^le.
L, it is true that absent a grant of the variance sought -^?
here, plaintiff would be denied a right to build upon his lot--the
very purpose for creating this subdivision.

ttkw&«-/p(f^^^^^^T^^^C^

^Foui^th/ granting the variance must not substantially affect
the general plan or be contrary to the public interest.

The

plaintiff's argument here is clear that any harm that may result
from building upon this lot is minimized because there already
exists development in the area which is not in accordance with the
plan.

However, this observation supports the argument for the

County as much as it does plaintiff's contentions, as it would be
in the^putAic interest to mitigate the damage already done.
/, the spirit of the zoning ordinance must be objpe^r^d,
andfsubstantial justice done. The Board concluded that this element
was not met because the very purpose of the ordinance is to prevent
construction

on slopes of this magnitude.

In reaching

their

decision, it was clear that they were concerned that very little
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data had been generated to support plaintiff's claim that the lot
was safe to build upon.

After this request for variance was

denied, a substantial portion of the delay in reaching a decision
on

the

takings

petition

was

because

the

County

was

giving

additional time for plaintiff to bring studies of the sort the
County would have liked to see at the initial hearing to the
commission, and so other-county officials could evaluate that data.
As the time for decision approached, the County represented that
they were trying to negotiate a resolution.

None was apparently

reached, the data supplied did not persuade the County to grant
plaintiff's request, and did not convince the County that the
ordinance effected a taking of the plaintiff's property.
The decision of the Board is supported in the way that such
decisions should be--the i nform^f -j pn whj r^hj22/^n^1' ff was jto provide
did not

convince

the

County

that

the

HpfprminaHnn_ t"hat~ t h ^

variance wottW.not comply with the spirit of the zoning ordinance,
-y—--^^

.

•

^

for would it comport with the general purpose of the ordinance.
This is the specific finding that Boards must make in order to
justify denial of a variance request. vIt_is^ .therefore. clear that
the^action of the Boardcarmot_befound arbitrary and^caprici^us^
or contrary to law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL J C ^ i g C N G S — - ^ ^

^—==10rT^1analyses

regarding

d e n i a l of p l a i n t i f f ' s

the question

request

of

for a variance

whether t h e
is a

t a k i n g s must b e g i n w i t h t h e P a l a z z o l o d e c i s i o n .
c a s e was f i r s t

brought

Board's

constitutional

At t h e t i m e

t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ,

the

the
only

i s s u e which a p p e a r e d t o c o n c e r n them r e g a r d e d w h e t h e r a p r o p e r t y
owner i n p l a i n t i f f ' s
restrictive

position,

ordinance

is

(one a c q u i r i n g o w n e r s h i p a f t e r

passed),

had

standing

to

maintain

a
a

t a k i n g s claim a g a i n s t the government.

However, of e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e

is

of

the

Supreme

regulatory
analysis.
sufficiently

Court's

board's
In

decision

other

final

treatment

words,

was
the

and d e f i n i t e

final
action

whether
for
of

to support

a

purposes
the

property-use
of

board

a fully

takings
must

be

ripe

takings

t h e S t a t e of Rhode I s l a n d c l a i m e d t h a t

because

claim.
Ripeness1
In Palazzolo,

t h e r e w e r e any number of o t h e r u s e s t o w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f

could

p u t h i s l a n d , t h e a c t i o n of t h e s t a t e i n d e n y i n g h i s r e q u e s t f o r a
More than one l o c a t i o n in the r e c o r d r e f e r s t o t h i s a c t i o n as a f a c i a l
c h a l l e n g e t o t h e slope o r d i n a n c e , which as s t a t e d i n Smith Investment Co. v.
Sandy C i t y , 958 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), does not r e q u i r e a r i p e n e s s
i n q u i r y . However, i t appears t o the Court t h a t t h e c e n t r a l premise of the
County's argument r e g a r d i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s f u t u r e a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n a v a r i a n c e i s
e s s e n t i a l l y a r i p e n e s s argument. Because t h e procedure p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e
zoning ordinances allows for v a r i a n c e s t o t h e o r d i n a n c e , t h i s i s an "as
a p p l i e d " challenge.
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variance for the specific purpose stated in the variance request
could not constitute a ripe takings claim.

The state's theory was

that some future request to use the land for some other purpose
than the one stated in his application, may result in the granting
of the variance as requested.

The Supreme Court rejected this

proposition because it was clear that in that case, the decision
handed down by the state Board precluded any other economically
viable use for the land.

Essentially, the restriction went to the

nature of the land which the plaintiff owned, and not to any
particular use which he proposed.2
The Supreme Court states:
Under our ripeness rules, a takings claim
based on a law or regulation which is alleged
to go too far in burdening property depends
upon the landowner's first having followed
reasonable and necessary steps to allow
regulatory agencies to exercise their full
discretion in considering development plans
for the property, including the opportunity to
grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.
As a general rule, until these ordinary
processes have been followed the extent of the
restriction on property is not known and a
regulatory
taking
has
not
yet
been
established.
Id. 533 U.S. 606 at 620-621.

The plaintiff in that case wanted to fill portions of the marshy,
coastal wetland he owned so he could build a beach resort. Without being able
to fill the land, the plaintiff would not be able to put most of the land to
any use.
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In this case, if the County's contention is true--that the
plaintiff had merely not presented a petition for variance upon
which the County could act--then it follows that the County's
denial of this variance does not, without more, show the extent of
the restriction on property.

However, the language which the

County chose provides at least colloquial support for a contention
that the decision precludes any building upon the lot, and hence,
deprivation of any economic value in the land:
Construction of a home on steep slopes, such
as on the Arnell lot, presents a host of other
problems and dangers that cannot be readily
anticipated or mitigated, including the threat
of slope instability, foundation slippage,
soil erosion, avalanche, fire, landslide,
falling trees and boulders, retaining wall
failure, and aesthetic impacts, not to mention
off-site impacts such as septic and irrigation
runoff.
While engineers can technically design
structures on steeper slopes, the 30% slope
limitation reflects nationwide standards that
balance protection of property rights with
protection of health, safety, and welfare of
the property owner, adjoining property owners,
and the general public.
Regulation of home
building on mountainous slopes is a common,
necessary, and proper exercise of police power
that increases overall safety and value in
property.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, p. 5,

^[5-6.

This

decision by the Board of Commissioners, after receiving the data
which the Board of Adjustment found lacking in the initial request
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for variance (the findings acknowledge receipt of "unsatisfactory
site-specific

geotechnical

data,

evidence

of

water

and

sewer

access, and related structural design." Id. at 3, % 7 (emphasis in
original)), states in absolute terms what the Board of Adjustment
was initially only prepared to state conditionally.

The Board

concludes:
The effect of granting an exception to, or
compensating Arnell might be that the County
is obligated to grant similar relief to other
lot owners similarly situated in existing and
future subdivisions, effectively rescinding
residential building restrictions on slopes
that have been accepted by property owners and
developers and enforced in the County for well
for
[sic] over 25 years.
Granting an
exception would defeat the purpose of the
Wasatch Canyon Master Plan and FCOZ and would
result in manifest injustice to those who have
complied in the past and will do so in the
future.
Id. at 5-6 f7.

This language does not demonstrate the County

lacked any opportunity to consider the plans for the site, or that
"the extent of the restriction upon the property is not known".
However, the failure to provide a report of the actual soils

on

the site in a form that was sufficient for the County to act
knowledgeably upon the request makes it impossible for the County
to determine whether the requirements for granting a variance have
been met.

The case, therefore, is not necessarily ripe.

Variance

requests regarding the FCOZ zoning ordinance have been, and will
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likely continue to be, granted upon the satisfaction of the Board
that the requirements for variance are met.

However, because this

conclusion is based upon information which can be used to support
either conclusion, the Court considers, for argument's sake, that
plaintiff's takings claim was ripe.
Standing
After reading Palazzolo, the hearing officer recommended that
the takings claim should not be denied based upon a lack of
standing..

The Court agrees that Palazzolo requires that outcome.

The factors ultimately rejected by the High Court, which
supported the Rhode Island Supreme Court's determination, "amount
to a single, sweeping rule: A purchaser or a successive title
holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlierenacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a
taking."

The Supreme Court continued, and determined that if Rhode

Island's suggestion were the rule,
the postenactment transfer of title would
absolve the State of its obligation to defend
any action restricting land use, no matter how
extreme or unreasonable.
A State would be
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date
on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be
the rule.
Future generations, too, have a
right to challenge unreasonable limitations on
the use and value of land.
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Accordingly, plaintiff is not denied standing merely because he
purchased

the

property

after

enactment

of

the

FCOZ

or

its

predecessors.
Application of Penn Central
The

petitioners

in

Penn

Central

sought

relief

from

a

historical landmarks statute which singled out some 4 00 of the more
than one million buildings in New York City (see, id. at 138-139
(Rehnquist, dissenting)), and which as applied to the petitioners,
restricted their ability to build on top of the existing Grand
Central Terminal, which they owned.

In holding that so restricting

the use of the valuable vertical air-space above the terminal did
not constitute a taking, the Supreme Court held that because the
terminal itself constituted a valuable economic use of the parcel,
it could not be said that the lot had been deprived of all economic
value.

The Court refused the suggestion of the petitioners that

the existing landmark should be considered separately from the
airspace above the property.
A "Penn Central1' analysis is intensely fact-specific.

This

has been recognized by the parties to this action, and by the
Supreme Court of this State.

The Court stated it this way:

[W] e have frequently observed that whether a
particular
restriction
will
be
rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for
any losses proximately caused by it depends
largely upon the particular circumstances in
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that case.
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries, the Court?s decisions have
identified
several
factors
that
have
particular significance. The economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly,
the
extent
to
which
the
regulation
has
interfered
with
distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations.
So, too, is the
character of the governmental action.
A
"taking" may more readily be found when the
interference
with
property
can
be
characterized as a physical invasion by
government, see, e. g., United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946), than when
interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (internal citations omitted).

No one interested in this

matter disputes that if the plaintiff is prohibited from making any
development at all, the economic impact upon the plaintiff would be
significant, nor that plaintiff purchased the property with the
expectation that he could build his canyon home thereon.

Not

unlike in Penn Central, the character of the governmental action is
not a physical

invasion of the plaintiff's property, but one

distinction here is that the statute in question has applicability
to many lots in the area where plaintiff's property is situated,
instead of the mere 400 properties out of more than one million.
Another difference is that the ordinance in question here is not a
blanket prohibition placing the burden of public benefit on the
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shoulders of so few, but rather, is a conditional prohibition which
affects every person who owns property which is above a certain
percentage of slope. These differences, including that this zoning
statute includes provisions for the safety of the public as well as
the aesthetical reasons, weigh against finding a takings here.
The primary difficulty with the manner in which this case is
presented on appeal is determining whether there is any room in the
rather broadly preclusive language in the findings and conclusions
of the Board of County Commissioners to find, as the County urges,
that not all economic use, as in Penn Central, has been precluded.
If

the Court were

to rely only upon the data in the record

excepting therefrom the findings and conclusions, its determination
of this matter would be simple.
plaintiff

was

provided

The record clearly supports that

multiple

opportunities

to

provide

information sufficient for the County to make its decision, but
failed to do so.

This parcel is on a steep slope.

not

for

unreasonable

the

County

to

have

less

It is clearly
than

complete

confidence in, or refuse to rely solely upon, the opinion of the
landowner, or even his architect, that it is safe to build, without
more.

The Court agrees with the statement at the end of the

conclusions of law that state
Regulation of home building on mountainous
slopes is a common, necessary, and proper
exercise of the police power that increases
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overall safety and value in property.
. . .Granting an exception would defeat
the purpose of the Wasatch Canyon Master Plan
and the FCOZ and would result in manifest
injustice to those who have complied in the
past and will do so in the future.
Id.

at

pp.5-6.

Regardless

of

the

difficulty,

the

Court

must

consider the language of the decision, and must, if possible, read
that decision consistent with the proceedings upon which it is
based.

To that end, there are portions of the decision that speak

to the analysis required under Penn Central. Among the reasons for
denying the plaintiff's takings petition which relate to the slope
ordinance, are a couple of points which would prevent plaintiff
from

putting

his

property

to

the

beneficial

use

he

desires

regardless if the County had granted his requested variance.

In

Paragraph 3 of the Conclusions of Law, the County stated that
Due to absorption limitations on steep slopes,
state and local health authorities preclude
construction of sewer drain fields on steep
slopes. Arnell has stated that he can connect
to a sewer but has not demonstrated that he
has, or can obtain, legal access across other
private properties to a sewer line some 800
feet downhill in Big Cottonwood Canyon. Until
such time as Forest Glen subdivision is put on
sewer, development on steep lots may be
unfeasible.
According to this statement, it is not clear that the plaintiff is
being denied use of his land by operation of the slope ordinance
because even if the variance had been granted, it may be the lack
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of adequate sewer accommodations that in the end results in the
prohibition against building, or the lack of adequate water supply
(see Conclusions at para. 4) .
Because the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the ordinance in
question is depriving him of any economically viable use for the
property, there has been no takings under Penn Central.
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT MADSEN'S CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff asserts three claims against defendant Madsen: (1)
breach

of

warrant

deed;

(2)

breach

of

implied

warranty

habitability; and (3) rescission based upon mutual mistake.

of
All

three claims are without merit and can be disposed of summarily.
There can be no breach of warranty deed under the undisputed facts
of this case because the warranty deed at issue failed to contain
a

covenant

Furthermore,

warranty
a

against

government

government
building

building

restriction

restrictions.
is

not

an

"encumbrance" and purchasers of land must take notice of public
statutes restricting the use of granted premises.

Utah does not

recognize a claim for breach of an implied warranty of habitability
in real property sales.

(Snowflower, 31 P.3d 576.)

There is no

mutual mistake concerning an "existing fact." The County's refusal
to grant a variance was a future act not an exiting fact and
plaintiff's knowledge of the law in the form of the County's slope
ordinance

is presumed.

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's
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Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Madsen is denied and
Madsen's cross Motion is granted.

Defendant Madsen's Motion or

Summary Judgment against Salt Lake County is now moot.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

Salt Lake County's Motion is

GRANTED, and Madsen's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in
part

(dismissing plaintiff's requested relief from Madsen), and

DENIED

in part

as moot

(Madsen1.s request

that

the County be

required to indemnify him as to any damages he is required to pay
to plaintiff).
This constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters
referenced herein.
Dated this C?-\

No further Order is required.
day of April, 2004.

tYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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19.93.010

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to establish procedures for:
A.

obtaining and analyzing information regarding a claim that the application or
enforcement of Salt Lake County zoning ordinances and / or land use
regulations to private property within the unincorporated areas of the County
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation; and

B.

determining whether it might be appropriate to grant administrative relief to
the claimant in the event it is determined that such application or enforcement
constitutes an unconstitutional taking,

19.93.020

Findings

The Governing Body makes the following findings:
A.

To further the public interest in lawful and responsible land development, and
promote the health, welfare, and safety of its residents, the County has
enacted zoning and other land development regulations applicable to
properties within unincorporated areas of the County, including new and
revised regulations applicable to properties in the county's canyons and
foothills; and

B.

In the event an owner of private property within the unincorporated area of
the County claims that the application or enforcement of County zoning
ordinances or other land use regulation constitutes an unconstitutional taking
of its private property, it is in the best interests of the County to have
established procedures for obtaining relevant information for analyzing such
claim and determining whether it might be appropriate to grant certain relief to
the claimant, rather than conducting such analysis in a more confrontational,
expensive, and time-consuming litigation context

19.93.030
A.

Taking Relief Procedures:
Petition & Submittal Requirements

Takings Relief Petition

Any applicant, after a final decision on its application is rendered by the Planning and
-1-

Development Services Director, Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment, or
Governing Body, may file a Takings Relief Petition with the Planning and Development
Services Director seeking relief from the final decision on the grounds that it constitutes
an unconstitutional taking of the applicant's private property.

B.

Affected Property Interest
The Takings Relief Petition must provide information sufficient for the District
Attorney to determine that the petitioner possesses a protectable interest in
property under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah or the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the event the Petition does
not provide information sufficient for the District Attorney to determine that the
petitioner possesses a protectable interest in property under Article I, Section
22 of the Constitution of Utah or the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Petition shall be returned to the petitioner.

C.

Time for Filing Petition
No later than thirty (30) calendar days from the final decision by the
Development Services Director, Planning Commission, Board of Adjustment,
Governing Body, or other County review authority on any site plan or other
type of zoning application the applicant shall file a Takings Relief Petition with
the Development Services Director.

D.

Information to Be Submitted with Takings Relief Petition
1.

The Takings Relief Petition must be submitted on a form prepared
by the Development Services Director, and must be accompanied at a
minimum by the following information:
a.

The name of the petitioner;

b.

The name and business address of the current owner of the
property; form of ownership, (whether sole proprietorship, forprofit or not-for-profit corporation, partnership, joint venture,
limited liability company, or other); and if owned by corporation,
partnership, or joint venture, or limited liability company, the
names and addresses of principal shareholders or partners or
members;

c.

The price paid and other terms of sale for the property, the date
of purchase, and the name of the party from whom purchased.
-2-

Include the relationship, if any, between the petitioner and the
party from whom the property was acquired;
d.

The nature of the protectable interest claimed to be affected,
such as, but not limited to, fee simple ownership or leasehold
interest;

e.

The terms (including sale price) of any previous purchase or
sale of a full or partial interest in the property by the current
owner, applicant, or developer prior to the date of application;

f.

All appraisals of the property prepared for any purpose, include
financing, offering for sale, or ad valorem taxation, within the
three years prior to the date of the Petition;

g.

The assessed value of and ad valorem taxes on the property for
the three years prior to the date of the Petition;

h.

All information concerning current mortgages or other loans
secured by the property, including name of the mortgagee or
lender, current interest rate, remaining loan balance, and term
of the loan and other significant provisions, including but not
limited to, right of purchase to assume the loan;

i.

All listings of the property for sale or rent, price asked and offers
received, (if any), during the period of ownership or interest in
the property;

j.

All studies commissioned by the petitioner or agents of the
petitioner within the previous three years concerning feasibility
of development or utilization of the property;

k.

For income producing property, itemized income and expense
statements from the property for the previous three years;

I.

Evidence and documentation of improvements, investments,
and expenditures for professional and other services related to
property made during the past three years;

m.

Information from a title policy or other source showing all
recorded liens or encumbrances affecting the property; and

n.

Information describing all use(s) of the property during the five
years prior to the Petition.
-3-
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2.

E.

The Planning and Development Services Director may request
additional information reasonably necessary, in his or her opinion, to
arrive at a conclusion concerning whether there has been a taking.

Failure to Submit Information
In the event that any of the information required to be submitted by the
petitioner is not reasonably available, the petitioner shall file with the Petition
a statement of the information that cannot be obtained and shall describe the
reasons why such information is unavailable.

19.93.040
A.

Taking Relief Procedures:
Determination of Taking

Preliminary Determination of Taking
1.

Prior to the appointment of a Hearing Officer, and based on a review of
the Petition and all relevant information submitted by the petitioner, the
Governing Body, upon advice of the Development Services Director
and the District Attorney, shall make a preliminary determination
whether a taking may have occurred. This preliminary determination
shall be made within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Petition and
submission of all information required to make such determination. In
the event the Governing Body makes a preliminary determination that
a taking may have occurred, the Governing Body may appoint a
Hearing Officer, elect to conduct either formal or informal
administrative proceedings, and proceed with a full review of the
Petition.

2.

If a preliminary determination is made that a taking may have
occurred, then the Development Services Director and District Attorney
shall recommend whether the hearing shall be formal or informal under
the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Governing Body for such
hearings.

3.

If upon the advice of the Development Services Director and the
District Attorney, the Governing Body finds that a taking has not
occurred, the Petition shall be denied and no Hearing Officer shall be
appointed.
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Appointment of Hearing Officer
The Planning and Development Services Director shall, within thirty (30) days
following a preliminary determination by the Governing Body that a taking
may have occurred, appoint a Hearing Officer to review information by the
petitioner, to hold a public hearing to determine whether a taking has
occurred, and to make a recommendation to the Governing Body concerning
the Petition.

Qualifications of the Hearing Officer
Every appointed Hearing Officer shall be licensed to practice law in the state
of Utah. Prior to appointment, the Hearing Officer shall submit a statement of
no potential or actual conflict of interest in connection with the Petitioner or
Petition.

Notice of Public Hearing
Within ten (10) days following appointment of the Hearing Officer, written
notice of a public hearing shall be published and posted in accordance with
Section 19.84.040.D. of this Title. The hearing shall be held within thirty (30)
days of the final date of written notice, unless a reasonable extension of time
is agreed to by both the Development Services Director and the Petitioner.

Conduct of the Hearing
The hearing shall be conducted according to the requirements of the Rules of
Procedure adopted by the Governing Body for such hearings.

Determining the Takings Issue
The Hearing Officer shall consider, among other items, the following
information or evidence:
1.

Any estimates from contractors, appraisers, architects, real estate
analysts, qualified developers, or other competent and qualified real
estate professionals concerning the feasibility, or lack of feasibility, of
construction or development on the property as of the date of the
Petition, and in the reasonably near future;

2.

Any evidence or testimony of the market value of the property both
under the uses allowed by the existing regulations and any proposed
use; and,
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3.

Any evidence or testimony concerning the value or benefit to the
petitioner from the availability of opportunities to cluster development
on other remaining contiguous property owned by the petitioner
eligible for such clustering as provided elsewhere in Title 19.

Burden of Proof
The petitioner shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the final decision that is the subject of the Takings Relief
Petition constitutes an unconstitutional taking.

Findings of the Hearing Officer
The Hearing Officer shall, on the basis of the evidence and testimony
presented, make the following specific findings as part of his/her report and
recommendations to the Governing Body:
1.
Whether the petitioner has complied with the requirements for
presenting the information to be submitted with a Takings Relief
Petition;
2.

Whether the petitioner has a protectable interest in the property that is
the subject of the Petition;

3.

The market value of the property considering the existing zoning
regulation.

4.

The market value of the property under the proposed use;

5.

Whether there are other economically viable uses that may be made of
the property;

6.

The market value of, or benefit accruing from opportunities to cluster
development on other remaining contiguous property owned by the
petitioner eligible for such transfer as provided for in Title 19 of the Salt
Lake County Code of Ordinances.

7.

Whether it was feasible to undertake construction on, or development
of, the property as of the date of the application, or in the reasonably
near future thereafter;

Whether the final decision that is the subject of the Takings Relief Petition
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation.

I.

Report and Recommendations of the Hearing Officer
1.

2.

If the Hearing Officer finds that the final decision which is the subject of
the Takings Relief Petition constitutes an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation, he or she shall remand the
matter to the Governing Body with recommendations concerning what
relief might be appropriate. In making such recommendations, the
Hearing Officer shall consider, among other factors:
a.

Approval of development on some portion of the property; or;

b.

A rezoning of the property to a more appropriate classification,
approval of an alternative development plan, modification or
waiver of normally-applicable development standards, or other
appropriate land-use regulatory action;

c.

An opportunity to cluster development;

d.

For property subject to the Foothills and Canyons Overlay
Zone, transfer of up to ten (10) percent of the maximum
allowable density that would otherwise be attributable to areas
with greater than thirty (30) percent slope on the subject
property to other developable portions of the property;

e.

A waiver of permit fees;

f.

Acquisition of all or a portion of the property at market value.

Recommendations for clustering within the boundaries of the subject
property owned by the petitioner shall require a written finding by the
Hearing Officer that such clustering and the resulting increase in
development density will be compatible with existing developments
and land use patterns on properties surrounding the subject property.
a.

For purposes of such "compatibility" finding, the Hearing Officer
shall compare the petitioner's proposed development
incorporating the increased transfer density with existing
development on surrounding properties, and take into
consideration the following factors:
(1)

Architectural character;
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b.

J.

(2)

Building size, height, bulk, mass, and scale;

(3)

Building orientation;

(4)

Privacy considerations in terms of privacy for prospective
residents within the petitioner's development and in
terms of privacy protection for adjoining land uses;

(5)

Building materials;

(6)

Building color; and

(7)

When applicable, operations of the petitioner's
development project, including but not limited to hours of
operation; activities that may generate adverse impacts
on adjacent land uses such as noise or glare; location of
loading/delivery zones; and light intensity and hours of
full illumination.

The report and recommendation shall be submitted to the
Governing Body and mailed to the petitioner within thirty (30)
days following the conclusion of the public hearing.

Governing Body Review and Consideration
1.

The Governing Body shall review the report and recommendations of
the Hearing Officer and approve or deny the Takings Relief Petition
within sixty (60) days following receipt of the Hearing Officer's report.
Provided, however, that the Governing Body may extend this period
upon a finding that due to the size and complexity of the development
or proposal and similar factors that additional review time is necessary.

2.

The Governing Body may hold a public hearing and provide notice as
set forth in Section 19.84.040.D. of this Title. Only new testimony and
evidence shall be presented at any such public hearing.

3.

The Governing Body may adopt any legally available incentive or
measure reasonably necessary to offset the taking, and may condition
such incentives upon approval of specific development or site plans.

4.

The decision of the Governing Body shall not become final until it
issues a decision approving or denying the Petition and specifying any
relief it may deem appropriate.
o

Time Limits / Transferral of Relief or Incentives
Any relief or incentives adopted by the Governing Body pursuant to this
chapter may be transferred and utilized by successive owners of the property
or parties in interest, but in no case shall the relief incentives be valid after
the expiration date of a specific development approval.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

BEFORE THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
— 00000—

In the Matter of a Takings Petition
Under Chapter 19.93 of the
County Ordinances
Filed by:
Jason P. Arnell
3441 South 2200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
RECOMMENDED DECISION

Location of Property Alleged
to be Taken:
Lot 13, Forest Glen Plat "B"
Salt Lake County

—00000—
Procedural History
Preliminary Determination of a Possible Taking
Following the County's denial of a discretionary variance to allow construction on his
property, Jason P. Arnell ("Petitioner") filed a Takings Petition under new Chapter 19-93. On March 28,
2000, in response to the Takings Petition, the Board of County Commissioners made a finding of possible
taking with respect to Petitioner's property in the Forest Glen subdivision in Big Cottonwood Canyon
(sometimes referred to as the "subject property"). This finding triggered the application of the hearing
procedures of Chapter 19-93. The undersigned was retained as independent hearing officer to conduct the
required hearing.
First Hearing and Determining of Hearing Procedures Under Chapter 19-93
On April 26, 2000 this matter first came before the undersigned for hearing pursuant to
written notice. Representatives of the County were present, including legal counsel for the County.
Petitioner was also present, and was represented by his legal counsel. Mr. William Gordon, a soil engineer,
and Mr. Troy McOmber, a licensed architect, also appeared for Petitioner. After an initial presentation by
Petitioner, the parties discussed with the Hearing Officer concerning the procedures to be followed in a
Chapter 19-93 hearing. After both sides were heard on the matter, the hearing officer ruled preliminarily and
procedurally as follows:
1.
The Hearing Officer must make findings of fact concerning each of the 7 factors
listed in subpart H, as well as making a finding on the ultimate issue: whether a legal
taking of property without just compensation has taken place. In doing so, the Hearing

Officer can receive the types of evidence contemplated in subpart F. As to each item of
subpart H, the Petitioner has the burden of proof as provided in subpart G.
2.
If as a result of the findings called for in subpart H, the Hearing Officer finds that
a taking of Petitioner's property by the County without just compensation has or
occurred, the Hearing Officer must proceed to make a recommended resolution of the
taking as provided in subpart L If no taking is found under subpart H, no action is
required under subpart I.
3.
Because Petitioner has the burden of proof, Petitioner is entitled to a fair
opportunity to present expert and factual evidence, and to have the County do the same as
it chooses. To accomplish this, a procedure for introducing evidence with intervening
time for preparation of countervailing evidence was established as follows, and so
communicated to the parties:
(a)
On or before June 30, 2000, Petitioner shall prepare and deliver to
the County and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from Petitioner
and such expert andfactual witnesses as Petitioner may retain relative to
the issues of subpart H Such written testimony may be in the form of
questions and answers or in summary opinion form. Petitioner, having
the burden of proof and of persuasion, is in the best position to set the
scope of the evidence by being first to file,
(b)
On or before July 25, 2000, the County shall prepare and deliver
to Petitioner and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from such
expert andfactual witnesses as the County may retain relative to the
issues of subpart H and in response to thepre-filed testimony of
Petitioner's witnesses.
(c)
On or before August 18, 2000, Petitioner may prepare and deliver
to the County and to the Hearing Officer written testimony from Petitioner
and such expert andfactual witnesses as Petitioner may retain in rebuttal
to the pre-filed testimony of the County. This will not be a second
opportunity to embellish Petitioner's case, but solely to rebut factual or
expert testimony of the County.
(d)
On August 28, 2000 at 9:00 AM in Room N3500 at the County
Complex, the Hearing Officer will convene a hearing to allow the County
to cross-examine the Petitioner fs witnesses and to allow Petitioner to
cross-examine the County's witnesses. All persons whose testimony was
prefiledfor either side will be expected to be present at this hearing unless
excused by prearrangement. Also at this hearing the parties will each be
allowed to make a summary argument at the conclusion of the evidence
taking and cross-examination. Such summary argument will go to the
issues of subpart H and also to the issues of subpart I, as appropriate.
4.
Items 1 and 2 of subpart H were stipulated by Petitioner and the County to be found in
favor of Petitioner. It was also stipulated by the parties that item 6 of subpart H was inapplicable to this
case, and thus could be deemed found in favor of Petitioner.

The Second Hearing
5.
As and when called for under the procedures established at the First Hearing, the
following witnesses prefiled written testimony1 for Petitioner:
(a)

Troy McOmber, architect

(b)

William Gordon, soil engineer

(c)

Jason Arnell, Petitioner

The following witnesses timely prefiled tesimony2 for the County:
(a)

Calvin Schneller, Director of Planning and Development Services for the County

(b)

Darlene Batatian, geologist

Rebuttal testimony3 was prefiled by Petitioner timely.

Petitioner also proffered the testimony of George Hansen, P.E. as contained in a letter from Mr. Hansen submitted in
connection with Petitioner's request for a zoning variance from the County. The undersigned accepts the testimony of Mr. Hansen
contained in his letter as evidence and part of the record. The quality of Mr. Hansen's testimony does not depart from that of the
other witnesses for the parties.
Both in offering the letter from Mr. Hansen (who also did not do property specific testing) and in the prefiled testimony of his
experts, Petitioner chose to offer summary conclusion testimony rather than test-supported detailed testimony. As highlighted in
cross examination, none of Petitioner's experts did property specific testing or design work to support their conclusions. However,
the County failed to offer opinion evidence based on property specific studies to contradict the summary conclusions of Petitioner
and his experts. Therefore the even quality of the evidence on both sides negates the impact of the lack of actual architectural
designs and soils and other tests on the subject property by Petitioner's witnesses. Whether detailed architectural designs and site
specific soils and engineering testimony ought to be required in Chapter 19-93 hearings is left to the Board of County
Commissioners or a future hearing officer to decide in another case.
None of the testimony or other submissions of Petitioner or his witnesses dealt with the ultimate issue of whether a government
taking without just compensation took place. Legal argument with respect to this issue was advanced in the Takings Petition. The
undersigned has accepted the reviewed such legal argument as part of the record in this proceeding.
2

Ms. Batatian offered summary testimony of the same quality as Petitioner's experts, but did not contradict the conclusions
reached by the Petitioner's experts. Mr. Schneller offered an argument position paper not directly disputing any conclusions of
Petitioner's experts. Whether detailed architectural design criticism and site specific soils and engineering testimony ought to be
required of the County in Chapter 19-93 hearings is left to the Board of County Commissioners or a future hearing officer to
decide in a future case.
None of the testimony or other submissions of the County or its witnesses dealt with the ultimate issue of whether a government
taking without just compensation took place. Oral testimony concerning the existence and timing of the adoption of the current
zoning ordinance, as well as scant references to the former zoning ordinances, was summarily offered at the first hearing, but not
followed up in the pre-filed testimony nor at the second hearing save in response to a question by the undersigned. The County
never introduced into the record copies of the current zoning ordinance or the prior zoning ordinance.
In response to a question from the undersigned, the County testified at the second hearing that the prior zoning ordinance also
provided a prohibition against building on a 30% or greater slope angle.
Petitioner's rebuttal testimony was a legal counsel summary of the evidence and argument. No new evidence was offered.

6.
On August 28, 2000, a second hearing was convened by the undersigned in Room
N3500 at the County Complex. The pre-filed testimony of all parties and witnesses was received into
evidence. Legal counsel for the County cross-examined Mr. Gordon, Mr. McOmber and Petitioner. Legal
counsel for Petitioner chose not to cross-examine the County witnesses. Closing arguments were made by
legal counsel for both parties.

Having heard the evidence and arguments, reviewed the applicable law, and otherwise being
folly advised and informed in this matter, the Hearing Examiner hereby submits the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
7.
The County has adopted and maintained zoning ordinances since sometime in the
1980's restricting and prohibiting development on property in Big Cottonwood Canyon having a slope angle
of 30% or greater, an angle determined by the County to be dangerous for construction of structures, given
the potential slide and runoff impacts on surrounding property owners.
8.
The County adopted the current zoning ordinance on August 15, 1997, and it
expressly prohibits construction of a residence on the subject property because of its 30% or greater slope
angle.
9.
Petitioner purchased the subject property on May 4, 1999, nearly two years after the
current zoning ordinance was effective, and several years after the prior zoning ordinance effectively
prohibited construction on the subject property. The subject property has an approximately 50% slope angle,
although the specific angle varies along the topography of the subject property.
10.
In connection with his purchase of the subject property, Petitioner undertook no
examination of the applicable zoning ordinances or other County requirements applicable to the subject
property. Petitioner observed the residences then existing on nearby lots in the same subdivision4 and
assumed that he could also build a similar residence on the subject property.
11.
Shortly after purchasing the subject property in 1999, Petitioner retained Mr.
McOmber to design a residence for the subject property. Petitioner was informed by Mr. McOmber
concerning the current zoning ordinance and its prohibition of construction on the subject property based on
its 30% or greater slope angles.
12.

Petitioner's property is substantially at or above a 30% slope angle.

The subject property is a lot in the Forest Glen subdivision. This subdivision was approved by the County long before zoning
ordinances prohibited construction on a 30% or greater slope, and long before Petitioner acquired the subject property. Petitioner
argues that the current zoning ordinance (and by implication the immediately prior zoning ordinance with a similar prohibition
based on the slope) are illegal modifications of the approved Forest Glen subdivision in violation of Section 17-27-810 UCA and
the holding in Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (1964). The hearing called for in Chapter 19-93 is to make findings as to
specific issues, and to recommend remedial action if an unconstitutional taking by the County has occurred. Chapter 19-93 does
not provide a forum for an appeal or general review of, or challenge to, the current zoning ordinance. I take the current zoning
ordinance as a legal and valid given in determining the existence of an unconstitutional taking under Chapter 19-93. Petitioner is
free to challenge the current zoning ordinances under Section 17-27-810 UCA and/or Wood in another forum, if such an action is
now timely. Such issues are irrelevant to the present proceeding under Chapter 19-93.

13.
Petitioner sought, and the County denied a variance based on the current zoning
ordinance and its prohibition of construction in Big Cottonwood Canyon on property having a 30% or
greater slope angle.
14*. Petitioner has complied with the requirements for presenting the information to be
submitted with a Takings Relief Petition under Chapter 19-93.2.
15*. Petitioner is the owner of the subject property, and thus has a protectable interest in
the subject property. (But see conclusions of law, below, as to Petitioner's standing to make a takings
claim.)
16.
is substantially $05.

The market value of the subject property, considering the existing zoning regulation,

17.
The market value of the subject property under the proposed use, without regard to the
current zoning ordinance, is $95,000, based on the recently negotiated price paid by Petitioner, and his
testimony concerning other recent sales of other lots in the Forest Glen subdivision.
18*. Given the application of the current zoning ordinance, there are no economically
viable uses of the subject property.
19.
There is no cluster development opportunity for the subject property as contemplated
in H.6. of Chapter 19-93.
20.
It is feasible, from an architectural, engineering and soils standpoint, for Petitioner to
construct a residence on the subject property, without regard to the current zoning ordinance. The
undersigned is making no finding concerning the economic feasibility of such construction, inasmuch as no
evidence was provided by any party as to the cost of creating the type of structure required to meet the
feasibility requirements of the architect, the structural engineer and the soils engineer.6

* These paragraphs make "findings" that are partly factual findings and partly legal conclusions. They are made here as
"findings" required by Chapter 19-93.
The subject property has a value greater than $0, although that value is impossible to ascertain in the absence of expert
testimony or actual offers from willing buyers. Certainly the value of the subject property is severely reduced as a result of the
zoning ordinance. I do note that "[mjere diminution in value is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by
regulation." Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1991). As the U.S. Supreme Court has declared, "'Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
m
the general law
Perm Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393,413, 43 S. Ct. 158, 159, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922)). Indeed, regulations causing significant diminution in value been upheld
against takings challenges. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 47 S. Ct. 114, 117, 71 L. Ed. 303
(1926) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394, 394, 36 S. Ct. 143, 143, 60 L. Ed. 348 (1915) (92.5%
diminution); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (89.5%); William C. Haas & Co.
v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1979) (95%); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 79 Cal.
App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776, 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (81%). For this reason I have made a finding of no value under the
current application of the zoning ordinance in order to avoid the effect of arguing about how little of the property must remain
before a partial taking is transformed into a full taking.
Petitioner's witnesses exhibited an unabashed "can do" attitude toward the ability to design a residence structure safely and
securely on the subject property, and to install the types of sewage system required. No consideration was given or testimony
offered as to the cost of the "feasibility".

CONCLUSIONS OF LA W
21.
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, which applies to the states (and
the County) through the Fourteenth Amendment, declares: "Nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. Const, amend. V.
22.
The Utah Constitution, Sec. 22 [Private property for public use], similarly provides
that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
23.
These constitutional requirements' primary purpose is mto bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2316,129 L. Ed. 2d 304
(1994).
24.
Petitioner makes what is called a "facial" attack on the current zoning ordinance. In
other words, the existence of the ordinance itself has the effect of a taking, rather than the way the ordinance
is applied. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. V. DeBenedictis, et al., 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Smith
Investment Company v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Ut. App. 1998).
25-

Under a facial challenge and claim of taking, a regulatory taking may be found if:

(a)
There is a denial of economically viable use of the property as a result of the
regulatory imposition;
(b)

The property owner has distinct investment-backed expectations; and

(c)
The interest in the property that was "taken" is recognized in state law as an
interest not otherwise subject to regulation as a nuisance.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc., et al v. The United States of America, 28 F. 3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
26.
While the effect of the current zoning ordinance on the subject property would meet
the three legal criteria just cited, there is a condition precedent to a valid claim by Petitioner for
compensation for a regulatory taking. The taking must be of "previously existing rights of property or
contract." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Put another way, Petitioner must have
legal "standing" to make any claim for relief. Legal standing requires an actual injury in fact.7
27.
Petitioner acquired the subject property approximately two years after the current
zoning ordinance was effective and had its devastating economic effect on the subject property. If the prior
zoning ordinance and its similar prohibition on construction is considered, the regulatory taking of the
subject property took place as many as 10-15 years prior to Petitioner purchasing the subject property. In
other words, Petitioner has had no property rights that he legally possessed in the subject property "taken" by
the County as a result of the application of the current zoning ordinance. He acquired the subject property
when it was already burdened by the current zoning ordinance, and the County has not taken any action other
than to apply the current zoning ordinance since Petitioner acquired the subject property.8 That Petitioner
7

See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("The traditional test for standing [is that a] plaintiff must be able to
show he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury which gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."); see
also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172, 94 S. Ct. 2940, 2944, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1974).

paid more than the true current value for the subject property is irrelevant to his lack of standing to make a
taking claim.9
28.
The denial of Petitioner's request for a variance to construct a residence on the subject
property was NOT an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.

CONCLUSION
AND
RECOMMENDED A CTION BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
Petitioner has not suffered a compensable taking of his property under Chapter 19-93, or
under the Utah or U.S. Constitutions. The Board of County Commissioners should dismiss the Takings
Petition without any compensation or reimbursement to the Petitioner of any kind.

Respectfully submitted as of September 11, 2000.

A. R. Thorup '
Hearing Examiner
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8

The denial of Petitioner's variance request was a discretionary action by the County, and does not transform this case from a
"facial" attack to an "as applied" attack for purposes of analyzing Petitioner's standing to claim compensation for a regulatory
taking under the Utah or U.S. Constitutions. The County made no additional exactions over what is required in the ordinance
itself.
If a claim for compensation existed for a regulatory taking of the subject property, such a claim would have matured at the
effective date of the first zoning ordinance to impose an effective prohibition against constructing a residence on the subject
property. The County's testimony places this date sometime in the 1980's or early 1990's. Even if the claim for compensation
"ran with the land", a conclusion that I do not make, it would appear that the statute of limitations on such a claim would have long
since run.

ADDENDUM NO. 4

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543
A. Robert Thorup

Direct Line: (801) 323-3359
Email: rthorup@rqn.com

BY FIRST CLASS MAIL
July 18,2001

Calvin K. Schneller
Division Director
Planning and Development Services Division
Public Works Department
Salt Lake County
2001 South State Street
Suite N3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-4200

Re:

Takings Petition of Jason Arnell under Chapter 19-93

Dear Mr. Schneller:
As you may recall, I was retained as an independent hearing officer to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and to render a recommended decision in the matter of the takings
petition filed by Jason Arnell regarding his lot in the Forest Glen subdivision in Big
Cottonwood Canyon. Pursuant to this assignment I conducted evidentiary hearings, heard
and received legal argument. After consideration of the facts and law, including the
inability of the parties to stipulate to basic requirements like jurisdiction and standing, I
rendered my recommended decision denying the petition, and delivered my written
decision to Mr. Tom Shafer (the person who hired me to conduct the hearing) on
September 12, 2000. In my cover letter, I indicated my assumption that a copy would be
sent by Mr. Shafer to Mr. Arnell and to Mr. Arnell's counsel. In the package sent to Mr.
Shafer, as is my practice with the County, I sent my bill for the costs of the hearings and
the decision.
A week later, on September 18, 2000, I write to Mr. Shafer to reduce my fee for the
Arnell matter based on a total cap on my contract that I learned about in acting as a
hearing officer for the Health Department.

Calvin Schneller
July 18,2001
Page 2

On October 6, I received a letter from David West, counsel for Mr. Arnell, asking for
me to reconsider my recommended decision and seeking a hearing on this request. Given
my sensitivity to the cost issue raised in my September 18 letter, I wrote to Mr. Shafer on
October 6 sending him a copy of Mr. West's letter and asking if the County desired that I
conduct further hearings and proceedings in response to Mr. West's letter1. ( I attach a
copy of my October 6 letter and Mr. West's October 4 letter).
On October 12, Kent Lewis Esq. of the District Attorney's office wrote to me
indicating that the issue was to be on the County Commission agenda on October 18 and
that the Commission would decide if it wanted further proceedings on the Arnell matter. (I
attach a copy of Mr. Lewis' letter.)
I never heard another word from Mr. Lewis or anyone at the County as to the
disposition of the Arnell matter or Mr. West's request by the Commission. Some months
after October, 2000, I talked with Pepper Moessinger in your office and asked about the
status of the Arnell matter. I believe that I also called Mr. Shafer with the same inquiry. I
recall that both Ms. Moessinger and Mr. Shafer told me that the County was working with
Mr. Arnell and that a resolution of the case was expected. With the passage of time, I
assumed that the case had been resolved and that Mr. Arnell was either building or
compensated or on his way to a lawsuit against his seller, or something. In any event, I
assumed that I was to conduct no further proceedings.
Mr. West has informed me that during this same time period (since October 2000),
he called Mr. Shafer and was told that the County was waiting for me to conduct further
proceedings and could not explain my delay in holding a new hearing and reconsidering
my decision. Obviously my reputation with Mr. West and others has been unfairly harmed
by the County failing to respond to my inquiries while at the same time blaming me for
delays in resolving the matter.
Believing that the matter was over, and not being aware of the misinformation being
given to Mr. West in the interim, I blithely sent a copy of a new Supreme Court decision to
Jeff Thorpe and to Mr. West on July 5, 2001, acting as one lawyer to another in a friendly
manner discussing a later development that was germane to an issue we had labored on
together in the past. My letter spurred Mr. West to write to me on July 10 chastising me for
failing to respond to his October petition for rehearing. (A copy of Mr. West's letter is
enclosed.) This letter shocked me and I immediately dashed off a letter on July 12
restating what I thought Mr. West had learned from my letter of October 6, 2000: that I did

As you can see, I intended to send a copy of my October 6 letter to Mr. West. He has informed me
that he never received my October 6 letter. My secretary must have fowled up and I apologize to Mr.
West.

Calvin Schneller
July 18, 2001
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not have the authority to sua sponte order a new hearing, but was waiting for the County to
decide if it desired more proceedings at my level or at the Commission (now Council) level
( a copy of my letter is attached).
On July 17, 2001 I met with Mr. West in the context of an ecclesiastical relationship
that has just recently arisen. In this meeting, I learned of Mr. West's anger over the poor
treatment he and his client have received, that Mr. West did not ever receive a copy of my
October 6 letter, and that Mr. West had been repeatedly told by the County that I was the
cause of delay in not moving ahead with a new hearing on the petition for reconsideration.
As I have compared what I learned from Mr. West with my own files and notes, I must
agree that since my delivery of my decision to the County, the County has handled this
matter poorly at best, and has hurt me in the process.
I am writing this letter for several reasons:
1.
You need to be aware of the keystone cops process being employed in this
matter, with my calls and letters saying one thing and communications to Mr. West saying
another.
2.
You need to be aware that I am personally offended by what appears to be
harm unreasonably inflicted on my reputation.
3.
You need to be aware that because of the ecclesiastical relationship that has
recently arisen between Mr. West and me, I cannot take any further role in this matter.
4.
You need to be aware that my recommended decision turned on my legal
conclusion that Mr. Arnell had no standing to seek redress of a taking claim, because the
claim arose when the property was owned by another person. On June 28, 2001 the
Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. The
Court held that taking claims arising in an earlier property owner could be asserted by the
subsequent owner (a copy of this case is attached). To the extent that the Arnell taking
claim is still pending final action in County, or even if it is ripe for judicial review, it is clear
that the Palazzolo case overrules my recommended decision, and will govern subsequent
proceedings. (My recommended decision found that a taking had occurred without just
compensation except for the standing issue.)

ruly yours,

(see next page for copied persons)

Calvin Schneller
• Firlv 18. 2001
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Copies with all enclosures:
Kent Lewis Esq., Deputy District Attorney
Jeffrey Thorpe, Esq., Deputy District Attorney
j/T3avid West, Esq., Counsel for Mr. Arnell

ADDENDUM NO. 5

BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNCIL

In Re: The Matter of James Arnell

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Findings of Fact
1.

On May 4, 1999, Jason P. Arnell ("Arnell"), a self-described commercial

building contractor experienced in hillside development, purchased lot 13, in Forest Glen
Subdivision plat "B," (" ArnelFs lot") for the purchase price of $95,000 (Affidavit of Jason
P. Arnell Takings Relief Petition). Forest Glen subdivision was created in 197 L ArnelFs
entire lot is on slopes greater than forty percent.
2.

Prior to the issuance of a building permit to construct a home on the lot,

staff advised Arnell that a variance to allow development on slopes greater than forty
percent would have to be approved by the Board of Adjustment.

The Foothills and

Canyons Overlay Zone Ordinance ("FCOZ") prohibits the building of a dwelling on slope
angles in excess of thirty percent, with an exception provision for lots of record with
slopes less than 40%. Petitioner's lot exceeds both the general slope requirement and the
special exception for lots of record.
3.

The Wasatch Canyons Master Plan, adopted in March 1989, incorporates

zoning provisions designed to "mitigate against erosion from development" and
discourages development on slopes in excess of 30% (page 15). In fact, development on
slopes in excess of thirty percent has been restricted or prohibited in Salt Lake County for
twenty seven years under the Forestry and Recreation Zone of 1974, the Hillside

Protection Ordinance of 1980 and FCOZ of 1997. The slope restriction is a key feature of
these zoning ordinances.
4.

5.

Chapter 19.72 of FCOZ states the purposes for the slope restriction:
•

the encouragement of development that fits the natural slope of the land and
minimizes the scarring and erosion affects of cutting, filling, and grading
related to construction on hillsides, ridge lines, and steep slopes;

•

the prohibition of activities and uses that would result in degradation of
fragile soils, steep slopes, and water quality;

•

the preservation of the visual and aesthetic qualities of (our canyon
environs) which are vital to the attractiveness and economic viability of the
county.
On February 16, 2000, the Board of Adjustment denied ArnelFs request for

a variance, concluding that the variance did not meet State and County requirements for a
variance, namely that the hardship created by the zoning ordinance was necessary to carry
out the general purpose of the ordinance and granting the variance would defeat the spirit
of the zoning ordinance and would not result in substantial justice. (See State and County
criteria for granting/denying a variance, section 19.92.042B, County Ordinances; and 1727-707(2)(a), Utah Code. Annot.)
6.

Having been denied a variance, Arnell filed a Takings Relief Petition with

the Salt Lake County Commission on March 14, 2000. The Commission appointed a^
hearing officer, Robert J. Thorup ("Thorup"). After lengthy hearings and consideration
of written arguments, Thorup concluded in a non-binding advisory opinion issued to the
Salt Lake County Commission on September 25,2000, that the slope restrictions in FCOZ,
section 19.93, did not cause or result in a compensable or unconstitutional taking of
ArnelFs property under Utah or U.S. Constitutions.

Thorup recommended that the

Commission dismiss Arnelfs Takings Petition without any compensation or reimbursement
of any kind.
7.

On November 1, 2000, the Board of County Commissioners continued for

six months a final decision on Arnell's Takings Relief Petition, which was again continued
by the County Council on June 12, 2001 for six months at Arnell's request, to allow time
for the parties to "conduct further investigation" and explore mutually acceptable
solutions. Arnell provided general information but unsatisfactory site-specific geotechnical
data, evidence of water and sewer access, and related structural design.
8.

On July 18, 2001, Thorup notified the County by letter of a United States

Supreme Court Case, Palazzola v. Rhode Island (decided June 28, 2001) that had not been
considered in his earlier recommendations. However, in the same letter, Thorup noted that
he could not take "any further role in this matter" due to an "ecclesiastical relationship that
has recently arisen between counsel for the petitioner and me."
9.

On November 13, 2001, the County Council reviewed Arnell's Takings

Relief Petition, heard legal arguments concerning the scope and meaning of Palazzola,
voted down a motion to rehear the matter before another hearing officer, and denied
Arnell's petition for a building permit or compensation subject to the approval of findings
of fact and conclusions of law to be drafted by the District Attorney's office.
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Conclusions of Law
1.

The County's master plan and zoning ordinance are designed to protect the

watershed, mountainside, property owners, and the public from dangers inherent in
building on steep slopes, particularly during times of high precipitation. Any diminution
of Arneirs property value is primarily due to the subdividor's failure to cluster or plat
buildable lots consistent with the natural lay of the land. The problems associated with
building on steep mountainous terrain were evident in 1971 when the Forest Glen plat was
recorded. Moreover, the plat could have been amended at any time in subsequent years to
reflect important changes in master plans and zoning regulations.
2.

Essentially, Arnell purchased a steep lot that is nearly impossible to service,

protect, and develop in an environmentally sensitive manner. Presumably, that is why the
lot was not purchased for nearly thirty years after it was recorded. It is a buffer lot or
natural view lot that has value especially when connected to a lot with development
potential. The County did not mislead Arnell, act in arbitrary or illegal fashion, create the
slope, nor cause the development problems associated with steep terrain. The prior
developer or Arnell knew or should have known of the problems inherent in steep slope
development. However, while Arneirs actual or imputed notice of FCOZ was a basis for
Hearing Officer Thorup's recommendation, this Council puts greater weight on the
following considerations:
3.

Due to absorption limitations on steep slopes, state and local health

authorities preclude construction of sewer drain fields on steep slopes. Arnell has stated
that he can connect to a sewer but has not demonstrated that he has, or can obtain, legal
4

access across other private properties to a sewer line some 800 feet downhill in Big
Cottonwood Canyon. Until such time as the Forest Glen subdivision is put on sewer,
development on steep lots may be unfeasible.
4.

Arnell proposes to build in a subdivision not currently serviced by a State

approved water system in compliance with Utah drinking water standards. While others
may have been permitted to build without adequate water in the past, Arnell is nevertheless
required by state law to have a year-round supply of safe water for household use and fire
protection.
5.

Construction of a home on steep slopes, such as on the Arnell lot, presents a

host of other problems and dangers that cannot be readily anticipated or mitigated,
including the threat of slope instability, foundation slippage, soil erosion, avalanche, fire,
landslide, falling trees and boulders, retaining wall failure, and aesthetic impacts, not to
mention off-site impacts such as septic and irrigation runoff.
6.

While engineers can technically design structures on steeper slopes, the 30%

slope limitation reflects nationwide standards that balance protection of property rights
with protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the property owner, adjoining property
owners, and the general public. Regulation of home building on mountainous slopes is a
common, necessary, and proper exercise of police power that increases overall safety and
value in property.
7.

The effect of granting an exception to, or compensating, Arnell might be

that the County is obligated to grant similar relief to other lot owners similarly situated in
existing and future subdivisions, effectively rescinding residential building restrictions on
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slopes that have been accepted by property owners and developers and enforced in the
County for well for over 25 years. Granting an exception would defeat the purpose of the
Wasatch Canyon Master Plan and FCOZ and would result in manifest injustice to those
who have complied in the past and will do so in the future.

Adoption of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Based on the foregoing, the Salt Lake County Council hereby approves the above
Findings and Conclusions in support of its November 13 motion to deny Jason P. Arnell' s
petition for a building permit or compensation.
DATED this

8th

day of _ January

, 2001

SALT LAKE COUNTY COUNCIL
ATTEST:
Chairman
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J^2J

Salt Lake County Clerk
Voting:
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Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
Councilman
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